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Abstract 
This chapter examines benefits and challenges of today’s scope for atypical family 
formations provided by social acceptance of both same-sex relationships and human 
assisted reproduction (HAR),  which now give  same-sex parents  genetically related children 
alongside the social connections  possible  through  formal or informal adoption.  
 Documenting formal legal changes, whether statutory or   through reported cases,62 is 
straightforward, unlike pinpointing the impact of acceptance of social change, identified by 
Maine63 as always the precursor of reform rather than a consequence. How then to identify 
such acceptance as a driver of norms, which in turn potentially generate reform? In 
developed societies this is invariably through the arts: literature,64 journalism, drama, music 
and other media, nowadays probably films, television and radio - favoured contemporary 
media appear to be largely electronic. 
It often surprises that English law had no formal adoption before 1926, 65  thus all supposed 
‘adoptions’ in Victorian novels, where a parent of either sex had no genetic children, were 
merely social  relationships,  despite  a limited concept of guardianship.     Today’s changes 
are especially striking compared with the relatively recent nuclear family (based on the long 
established model of two opposite sex parents and their natural or adopted children) which 
was ‘the family’.  The pace of change has also been so swift, despite initial resistance to 
dropping traditions, that the perception of the now multi-faceted family has itself been 
overtaken by newer perspectives than those begun in 2002-4 by recognition of trans 
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persons for all purposes, same-sex relationships66, HAR , 67same-sex marriage68 and now the 
intersex debate69.   
Sadly these radical changes of perspective have themselves impacted on the crucial role of 
surrogacy in assisting male same-sex couples to  have genetically related progeny. 
Introduction 
It is unfortunate that, at the very point where it appears that the lengthy historical 
background to the normative acceptance of same-sex relationships has taken a positive 
turn, there should arise an unexpected obstacle to full acceptance of the new family format 
whereby same sex partners can now found their own families of genetically related children.  
The problem seems to have been created by the fluidity of gender created by a new 
perception of an ‘intersex’, or third - ‘X’ - gender, in cases where individuals claim that they 
recognise themselves as belonging to neither one established gender nor the other.  
In other words it appears that English law(having finally  been proactive in recognising both 
full conversion in trans cases for all purposes and full recognition of same-sex  and  opposite 
sex relationships in both civil partnerships 70 and marriage)  has had to accept that  the full 
equality English law provides has now stalled in cross border contexts;  and that r English 
law can do nothing about  international impacts on intersex persons  of English or Welsh 
origin (although the UK does  itself recognise the practical  ‘X’  solution for our own  
passport purposes).  This adverse impact is because some jurisdictions recognise  only the 
traditional binary ‘M’ and ‘F’, although it seems to be accepted in most western jurisdiction  
that the current ‘younger’  (18-24 year old) generation ‘swings both ways’ : indeed  in a 
recent  YouGov poll 43% describe themselves as ‘sexually fluid’ – neither straight nor gay. 
This group includes Hollywood’s ‘most prominent bi-sexual’, film director Desire Akhavan, 
creator of a new sitcom The Bisexual,aired on Channel 4 in late 2018.71 
Coupled with the lack of an international surrogacy regime, recognising the consequent 
parent-child relationship which parental orders under current English law72 bestow, this 
means that some same-sex partners still do not have true equality if they leave our own 
jurisdiction despite their status at home. Nevertheless some other jurisdictions, for example 
India, have been proactive in ensuring that surrogacy tourism does not impact adversely on 
either the resulting child or on the surrogateThe impact of concerns about originally 
unanticipated and undesirable side effects of surrogacy  has not been softened by the fact 
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that positive development  for same sex relationships have arisen concurrently with a major 
national and international initiative to curb both paedophile child abuse and international 
trafficking, for which surrogacy is often a perfect pathway for those who are intent on its 
abuse. 
 Unfortunately, owing to insufficient surrogates in England and Wales, inter alia no doubt 
because  surrogates can only be paid expenses in our jurisdiction,  ‘surrogacy tourism’ has 
inevitably afforded such trafficking opportunities, also no doubt as, despite UN efforts, 
there is no worldwide common law or practice governing surrogacy.  Thus those seeking 
such facilities in less regulated jurisdictions will inevitably cross borders to a location which 
permits them the most freedoms.    
While there is no essential connection between same-sex relationships and parentage and 
an escalation in such abuse, nevertheless inevitably child protection concerns arise. This 
may in turn be because of the relatively new intersex potential which is seen as a likely 
facilitator for paedophile access to children for such abuse, unlike in previously clearly 
defined ‘M’ and ‘F’ distinctions, which in practice can matter to other M/F segregated  users 
in many contexts, ranging from passports to a wide variety of unisex facilities.  
This sadly masks the equally important fact that surrogacy is essential to a relationship, 
whether same- or opposite-sex, in which the partners cannot reproduce naturally so as to 
create a stable family unit, complete with parental responsibility, gender neutral parenting 
and welfare paramountcy; which is precisely the sort of stable family unit which 
governments regularly concede is the backbone of society. Have we thus only made 
progress that brings an element of retrogression? A look at the past is encouraging though 
not entirely conclusive. 
Historical and recent pastIt is not long since, in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st 
century, families were still apparently formed of two opposite sex parents with 2.4 children, 
a dog and a Volvo: which for a short time seemed to be what same sex parents aspired to in 
searching for successful mainstreaming of the atypical family formats which are now firmly 
part of English family law.73  It would therefore be useful to look first at the historical 
background, in which to set in context the drivers for change and the subsequent 
developments which have led to the intersex debate and the challenges faced by same 
same-sex parents, including in relation to surrogacy. 
By 2010, some thirty years after courts doubted the advisability of allowing children to live 
in lesbian households, such as in the 1991 case of B v B Minors (Custody, Care and Control, 74 
the same sex model was so successful that film director Lisa Chodolenko risked making her 
(eventually award winning) family comedy The Kids Are All Right, starring Julianne Moore 
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and Annette Bening, whose characters typified the lesbian IVF parents with sperm donor 
father of their teenage children which was often the model of the time . This was a film 
which then won both an Oscar nomination and a Golden Globe for Best Film, thus probably 
constituting a stronger argument for the normativity  of atypical families than any other 
contribution from the arts since the distinguished children’s writer, Jeanette Winterson, was 
first published in 1985.75 Sadly, though it may have generated some thoughtful acceptance 
by the broader intelligentsia,  it gained little approval from the gay community in general 
and lesbians in particular, who decided it was far from ‘All Right’, despite positive reviews in 
The Guardian, 76which commended the ‘warm and witty’ account of ‘the post-modern 
family’, but which did not stop The Independent’s Arts Writer presenting the counter view 
that all the prize winning film mainstreamed was straight fantasies about lesbians. 
Unfortunately, however, such mainstreaming integration is still not the case in many other 
jurisdictions, a situation clearly creating problems for contemporary border crossing families 
routinely seeking regular employment and established residence - as well as holidays and 
other short term stays - outside the United Kingdom. Such families are thus finding that 
English and Welsh Child Law is one of the most progressively inclusive, while foreign 
provision may not be nearly as generously inclusive as they have at home.  
Thus  our home jurisdiction’s provision compares very favourably with that of only three 
decades ago  when English and Welsh judiciary used to be wary of even allowing children to 
live in gay families because of concern that,  at that stage,  this was so unusual and outside 
the mainstream that judges worried about embarrassment for such a child. As a result it was 
thought that the child was likely,   from its  atypical gay parented family, to  be identified by 
other children as sufficiently different  that  bullying  at  school could be inevitable. For 
example, the case already mentioned in this context,  B v B (Minors) (Custody, Care and 
Control)77 generated a lengthy court room debate about whether it would be ‘safe’ for a 
young child to live with his lesbian mother following a divorce, despite the fact that since he 
was so young this would otherwise be the obvious place for him. However owing to the 
judge’s fear that he would be noticeably ‘different’ at school, coming from a lesbian home, 
and thus be picked on by children from straight homes this generated a substantial 
discussion, fortunately  then resolved by the consultant psychiatrist in the case, who 
thought that in fact this disposal would pose no real risk owing to the continuing influence 
of the father who had a heterosexual partner whom he hoped to marry.    Thus it was 
accepted that that would be sufficient to counteract any adverse effects, especially as the 
judge noted that the mother was ‘not a militant lesbian’ and could provide continuous child 
care, while the father would have had to use a childminder. Perhaps this bullying fear was 
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not unreasonable, owing to anecdotal reports of continued contemporary bullying even 
today of trans people in some overseas common law jurisdictions78 where such atypical 
family members have not yet become sufficiently integrated.  
Indeed it seems that neither Europe in general, nor the EU in particular, has achieved such a 
high standard of inclusiveness for post-modern family formats as in England and Wales. 
Despite the fact that in the 2018 Coman case79 the CJEU required EU states to recognise 
same-sex marriage from other jurisdictions, even where a state does not recognise same-
sex marriage domestically, this has been described as only a ‘small step’, since it does not 
extend to registered partners.  Moreover, while the decision is naturally welcomed,  it 
seems that its effect on LGBT relationships is not yet fully assessed, so that border crossing 
for same-sex relationships is not yet uniform by any means.   This is a pity as these diverse 
continental legal systems within Europe have between them contributed so much towards 
the development of English Law since Lord Denning’s memorable comment on how EU 
influences would be likely to work after our accession to the then EEC, 80which he saw as ‘an 
incoming tide’…which ‘flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back…’. 81   
Considering the role of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) in developing 
English family Law, and the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) which its decisions enforce, the fact that English Law is now actually ahead in 
comparison with such continental resources is surprising, since the obvious initial practical 
watershed was as recent as the case of Goodwin v UK (2002)82.  This case only then finally 
ended years of argument about the extent of the UK’s margin of appreciation in relation to 
our traditional treatment of the right to marry which, despite EU equality and diversity 
principles, we had obstinately insisted was reserved only to those opposite sex couples 
whose biological sex had been irrevocably determined at birth by each individual’s 
chromosomes. This was clearly a tight restriction which had (since Corbett v Corbett83) 
prolonged prevention of their marriage of many successfully trans people in their new 
gender.  
Thus Goodwin definitively opened the gates to plurality in family relationships in English 
Law, since the Court famously declared that the margin of appreciation held by individual 
states is not available to reduce Convention rights ‘so as to impair the very essence of the 
right’, though also criticising the UK for not progressing further and sooner on this issue and 
for failing to take action on the Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on 
Transsexual people, 2000. It is therefore disappointing that nothing has been done to 
prevent member states placing strict requirements on the conditions for recognition of the 
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new gender. The move across Europe towards the self-declaration model has led to many 
further challenges before the ECtHR in this issue. 
It is also disappointing  to find that there are still practical family membership problems in 
cross border movement in Europe, especially since the UK specifically addressed this 
perceived problem in relation to English Law, following the case of Wilkinson v Kitzinger (No 
284)  (in 2006) by passing the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. However, persistence 
of such border problems on the continent has not been for want of effort in 
Europe.Following this review of historical progress it will be convenient to consider drivers 
for social change and to move on to further currently troubling issues such as transpersons 
and surrogacy.  
Fast forward from the Goodwin watershed 
 
Surprising as it is that there has not been a successful initiative to develop a common 
 European Standard to create an EU wide definition of, for example, ‘what makes a de jure 
family’ - as other state level and federal differences have been harmonised in other large  
territories with a federal jurisdiction. For example  Australia, which has always had a  
practical  approach to social norms and early exhibited a spirit of leadership in developing 
the mothercountry’s common law to meet contemporary social demands. Indeed, it was  
the first of the Commonwealth former colonies to recognise the atypical nature of  
unmarriedfamilies in coining the phrase ‘de facto’ in relation to cohabiting couples, who are  
also referred to as ‘de factos’85.   
Nevertheless it took them time to legislate and same-sex marriage was not legal until  
December 2017.86 It seems there was some opposition and mixed feelings about 
same sex relationships which temporarily  stood in the way , although this was 
 also anticipated in England and Wales (especially in deeply traditional ‘chapel’  
congregations in Wales) in connection with the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013.  
 Nevertheless the eventual disappearance of threatened opposition (rife in the media  
at the time)  to the  2013 Act in England and Wales  seems  
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to confirm that such initial opposition evaporated, and the same seems eventually to have  
happened in Australia..  
Curiously there seems to have been little opposition to same-sex marriage in the Republic of 
 Ireland which is, of course, not part of the UK (and such legislation is progress indeed 
 In this formerly staunchly Catholic jurisdiction, although the result of the referendum of 22 
 May 2015, following which a date was set for implementation, showed substantial support 
 for the reform) . 
 Law reform of this sort can be slow. This is because such reform does not stop with its  
initial legislative action, since it is necessary to examine all the possible consequential  
amendments required, which may include formerly core principles of the law of  
marriage, which in turn owed their existence to the formerly ‘heteronormative  
underpinnings of marriage’: for example, in England and Wales, consummation had already 
 had to be taken out othe Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) 
 Act 2013, and neither permits ‘adultery’ to be a basis, respectively,  of dissolution or 
 divorce.   
 The USA has had a similar experience to Australia, where reform was expected to be quick, 
 but it took a blanket Supreme Court ruling that all states must recognise marriages in other 
 states within the union, and that all states must issue marriage licenses permitting same- 
sex marriages, and thus firmly to retreat from the previous position where permitting such  
marriages could be decided at state level,87 but which initially some regional judges were  
not entirely happy with.  
However, in practice this would seem to be the way forward internationally, where 
youngfamilies of spouses, partners and children regularly cross borders in pursuit of work or 
pleasure, and this consideration was certainly a driver in passing the Marriage (Same-Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 in England and Wales, following the case of Wilkinson v Kitzinger88 which 
highlighted the contemporary practical problems89. The Appellants in this case were two 
women, married in Canada where same-sex marriage was available, but who then 
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happened to come to England and were surprised to find their marriage was only a civil 
partnership in England and Wales.  However the point appears immediately to have been 
grasped at government level that that it would be a different case for a young migratory 
couple with children following employment or recreation.  In that context the problem 
would naturally be more practically acute, causing extensive practical problems in 
contemporary bureaucracy, whether in relation to social welfare benefits or practical 
parenting, including in such everyday contexts as in giving consents for the various minors’ 
activities and medical care that now require formal consents before a child can do anything 
much but simply go to school. 
The impact of social change more generally in Family Law 
There may be parallels between acceptance of same –sex relationships generally and public 
opinion’s change of view on No Fault Divorce (with 2019 legislation in process, following the 
failed Owens v Owens 90divorce).  Owens regenerated the No Fault Divorce debate, a 
concept virtually unanimously rejected at the last attempt to introduce it in 199691.  At the 
same time the existing Facts on which a Divorce is currently still granted under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 could be repealed and adultery also removed from the Act, as 
well as the other contentious Fact of behaviour sufficiently unreasonable for the petitioner 
to continue to be expected to live with the respondent.  Adultery is already thought to be 
inappropriate in an era of equal marriage92 and it seems that public responses to surveys 
and opinion polls have suggested that the ordinary person would probably now not mind if 
England and Wales had a No Fault Divorce system as exists in many other jurisdictions. 
Certainly, the original practical justification for the concepts of consummation and adultery, 
currently retained in the 1973 Act, no longer exists except in a tiny minority of cases since 
the need for them is rare in modern times93.   It is no longer necessary even for peers to 
have doubts about their heirs’ legitimacy as there is now reliable DNA testing which is 
already often used under the Child Support Acts and is also clearly available for determining 
parentage in other contexts, such as by trustees of settlements who must pay the correct 
beneficiaries as set out in the trust deed. Succession to a British peerage or title of honour 
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may still not be achieved by an adopted son or daughter94, even though the requirement for 
male primogeniture is no longer essential in the case of peerages which at the time of grant were 
bestowed already enabled to descend by special remainder through the female line or to another 
family member such as a brother, perhaps because it was clear there was already no male heir. 
There were probably reasons not relevant here for no importation of Roman Law’s 
sophisticated adoption system into English Law until the Adoption and Children Act 2002 
was amended following the Civil Partnership and Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Acts. 
Adoption would not have fitted the traditions of English life which subsisted up to the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s, although the Romans had specifically made such adoptions work 
when their families were otherwise childless.  
Transperson  and Other Contemporary Family Formats and Identities 
Thus while families are creating their own shapes and functions on the ground, there is now 
emerging some literature on the subject which suggests that some sort of formal 
frameworks are desirable to reflect the developments of original terms into less 
revolutionary and more evolutionary concepts which can now be extracted from what has 
gone before in preceding periods, but which have since apparently settled well into an 
contemporary mode capable of embracing post-modern social norms.  
Scherpe’s contribution to this debate,  ‘Breaking the Existing Paradigm of Parent and Child 
Relationships’95,  emphasises that ‘We need a Family Law for families’ – addressing reform 
from a radical starting point as we ‘cannot amend law based on a 2 parent paradigm, which 
depends on individual societal and legal contexts’.  
Perhaps, however, not entirely starting with a blank sheet of paper, since sharing family law 
experience, from both other common law and civil law jurisdictions, can be extremely 
valuable, including taking relevant experience from all disciplines working in Family Justice. 
This is especially so as there already exist a number of contemporary initiatives which bring 
together such wider experience, rather than just lawyers’ resources,  so as to enable the 
worldwide family law community to draw on  such sources for mutual  benefit.  
However, whatever the position in Europe and the EU, there is much in English Law that 
already works to support evolving contemporary family formats , but also inevitably some 
new and unclear areas which require articulating (for example, intersex identity, which can 
now apparently blur the same- and opposite-sex identity of family members, and also 
multiple parenthood in human assisted reproduction), neither of which are arguably yet 
sufficiently thought out so as to be included in stage 1 of any further likely reforms.   
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Of these the intersex debate is arguably the most urgent, but also the most complex. This is 
because, owing to the Re Elan Cane decision in the High Court96, where the court found that 
this intensely practical issue – which requires everyone, with rare cultural exceptions, to 
identify on identity documents used around the world with one of the binary identities, i.e. 
male or female - did not constitute a breach of the claimant’s human rights, regardless of 
her strongly felt emotional reasons for not wishing to have a gendered identity. Such a clear 
practical impact is obviously one of the most important drivers of social change in 
recognising the way in which family formats are themselves changing because of the 
contemporary changes in the identities of family members. Nevertheless it was also held 
that if the gender entry required was a breach of her human rights, the Passport Office’s 
reasons for not being able at the present time to issue a passport without such identification 
were a proportionate response to the government’s need for gendered identity. However 
the decision also noted that this should not continue indefinitely, since the Passport Office 
staff appear to have told the High Court that their processes will not allow a passport to be 
issued if the ‘M’ and ‘F’ sections on the application form are not completed, and that they 
are not at present in a position to make changes to address this, but that there is an 
investigation in process which needs to be completed first.   
In fact some jurisdictions, e.g. Australia, New Zealand and Malta, have (it seems quite 
happily) already agreed to use the non-binary category ‘X’ on their passports, a solution 
which could be adopted in the UK (although that would not go far enough for Christie Elan 
Cane) and it seems that Germany has also already decided that the use of the ‘X’ category is 
unconstitutional, since the German constitution requires all German citizens to be described 
in a positive manner, which it seems the anonymous ‘X’ category  is considered in Germany 
not to do. 
In the meantime it seems that there is a lobby for a more detailed genetic designation of a 
child’s parentage than is afforded by the present processes under the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 1953, and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 2008, even 
though they currently combine, and have since that 2008 Act,  to allow for the 
contemporary inclusion of  two same-sex parents and, where in the case of two women 
being the child’s parents, and both with parental responsibility97, the omission of any father 
on the birth record. 98 
This seems curious because  ‘the father’ was formerly a category of parent historically so 
revered in English Law that courts still will not, pursuant to the Children Act 1989 s 13(1),   
normally countenance the removal of his family name from that of children whom he has 
fathered,  without very sound benefit supporting the change.  Nevertheless this is often 
convincingly advocated on the part of (usually) the applicant carer mother,   who is, 
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however, usually still routinely suspected of wanting to make this change only to airbrush 
him out of her post-relationship life which the courts usually resist. 
Similarly, in the case of two men having been enabled to have genetic children - though this 
was not as common or as publicised before Elton John and David Furnish had their sons, 
Elijah and Zachary it seems there is the same lobby for a full genetic record99 although it 
may be queried whether this will now assume the same importance owing to the fact that a 
man with a womb has since actually given birth, not only once but now three times100. This 
was Thomas Beattie, aged 38 at the time of the first birth, an American female to male 
transperson who became pregnant after living as a man with his male partner in the North 
of England for 5 years, whereupon he gave birth first to a girl in 2011, and then the 
following year to a boy, after taking female hormones to reverse the effects of his female to 
male sex change treatments. It seems he has since had a third child and is correctly referred 
to as a ‘male mother’ in accordance with HFEA 2008, s 33, since he is the person who has 
given birth to the children. 
 
The Impact of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 
However, it seems that the real catalyst for a settled normative impact on same-sex 
relationships in English law, and their new family format with genetically related children, 
has been the 2013 Act which has finally enabled same-sex parents to marry. There was 
actually a lobby for this from the 1980s,  when Martin Bowley QC pressed for marriage for 
gays, and for gay men to be on the Bench, for which Lord Hailsham, as Lord Chancellor, was 
however unwilling at that time. Moreover, although Lord Mackay, as Lord Chancellor in 
1991, apparently agreed to gay appointments in the higher courts, the current Master of the 
Rolls, Sir Terence Etherton, is the first openly gay senior appointment.   
This sudden progress from civil partnership to marriage may in fact have been a surprise: 
when research was conducted into whether the LGBT community really wanted to convert 
its civil partnerships into full marriage, the results indicated mostly contentment with their 
existing status.  They did not want to upgrade to marriage:  there thus appeared a real 
possibility not only of the threatened disturbances promised by those opposing the statute, 
but also that there would be no demand for the marriages it would permit. However clearly 
these results were no more accurate than election day early returns from polling stations, as 
the civil partnerships and same-sex marriage statistics in the 18 months following the 
enactment of the Act: far from there being no demand for same-sex marriages,   many new 
same sex marriages were conducted once this was possible, but as soon as s9 was brought 
into force in March 2014 (enabling conversion of existing civil partnerships marriage)15,000 
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more same-sex marriages were contracted and their numbers snowballed dramatically,  at 
the same time giving the marriage statistics a lift.101 
The Likely Drivers for This Marked Degree of Social Change from Civil 
Partnership to Same-Sex Marriage 
A first prompt might have been the Elton John-David Furnish conversion of their civil 
partnership to marriage, actioned as soon as it was possible in March 2014 despite the 
Birmingham poll: they had to convert, if minded to do so, as they were already in a civil 
partnership, and would have had to dissolve the earlier civil partnership in order to marry in 
2013 before s9 conversion was possible. It should be remembered that while they live in 
California, this couple is British and they have a significant UK following. A second  was 
possibly the lack of pre-supposed adverse reaction to the 2013 Act, expected from the 
combined religious lobby, but not least from the traditional churches who were vehemently 
against reform, whereas nothing of this expected opposition materialised, still less 
disruption. It seems that by 2013 the wider public as well as the adverse pressure groups 
were ‘over’ the shock of the abandonment of the principles of Hyde v Hyde (1866)102, 
especially as the 2013 Act was presented as an equality statute. None of the predicted 
violent opposition therefore happened, and, by 2014 and after, same-sex partners were 
apparently simply settling into marriage and building a family to support their new 
normative status as married couples. 
It would therefore seem that English Law had in this instance already managed to place the 
crucial social and legal change in the right order before the Act reachedthe statute book, 
thus recognising the optimum point on the ascending curve of ‘social change’ as well as on 
the intersecting graph of ‘legal change’, as identified by Maineone of the forefathers of the 
modern sociology of Law and a leading figure of the English and German schools of historical 
jurisprudence. While Maine had set out this theory of the relationship between law and 
social change in his classic text, Ancient Law103 in the mid 19th century, this  remains an 
influential work in more than the academic  field of law in society, which had long before 
2013  identified changes in status and social custom in early societies as always preceding 
changes in  the law, and it seems in modern times (when fundamental changes in our social 
lifestyles have been recently so radical) that we would be well advised to note such 
anthropological principles which provide powerful support for the legal reforms introduced .   
Thus did the LGBT community achieve statistically unremarkable families and without any 
revolutionary or disruptive element.  
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Was there perhaps a third prompt? –if so was this the simple passage of time from the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 to the 2013 Act? This seems to have been solicitor Duncan Ranton’s 
theory when he examined the likely underlying reason for the comparatively sudden 
upgrade from civil partnership in 2004 to marriage in 2013,104 questioning the reason for the 
government’s compromise before their then ‘grasping the nettle’ in 2012-13, followed by 
the LGBT community’s enthusiastic adoption of their newly permitted married status.   This 
theory of the right moment for the impact of social change in family law to find its mature 
moment105 is not new and is also identified in mainstream historical jurisprudence, to which 
19th century school, developed in Germany, Maine belonged.  
There might also have been a further prompt from the growth of surrogacy following the 
HFEA 2008, in which new detail emerged in relation to the birth of Elton John’s second son 
who happened to be born in the year of the 2013 Act - this family inevitably thus focussed 
attention on LGBT interests, prompting the media to reveal that both boys had the same 
surrogate mother who was also a good friend, remaining in touch with the family. Whether 
or not this was truly a happy IVF family as presented, the  boys and their parentage  clearly 
generated regular LGBT publicity,  drip-feeding that the couple  had entered into a civil 
partnership in 2005 as soon as the 2004 Act came into force, adding children as soon as the 
2008 Act provided the obvious normative pathway by updating the original  HFEA 1990 to 
take account of developments in same-sex partnerships afforded by the Civil Partnership Act 
2004, and finally marrying when that status was also available.  
Since surrogacy is clearly essential for male same-sex genetically related families some 
escalation of the numbers of partnerships availing themselves of this pathway to the 
normative family may be expected. Indeed, further reforms may be expected to reflect 
changes in circumstances if the escalation continues. This is not least as there is likely to be 
a shortage of surrogates leading to cross border surrogacies with all the problems of 
competing English and overseas provisions in disparate legal systems, which have already 
been experienced in adoption, which prior to the 1990 HFEA was the only way forward for 
couples unable to conceive their children naturally106. 
Male Same-Sex Families and Surrogacy 
However while surrogacy is essential for male same sex genetically related families, 
unfortunately it also still has some perception problems, not least for the male same-sex 
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partners concerned. It was an unfortunate coincidence that the growth of surrogacy around 
the HFEA 2008 coincided with both the Yew Tree paedophilia and child pornography 
investigations which were nationwide in the UK, and with muddled recollections of the 
historical gay parenting residence order cases when older judges thought lesbian partners 
needed male influence from somewhere for ‘balance’.107Since then surrogacy appears to be 
on the cusp of a change of identity following some activity in 2018 under the auspices of Sir 
James Munby, the outgoing President of the Family Court, who took the opportunity of time 
available after his retirement to attend the Progress Educational Trust’s one day conference 
on 5 December 2018, which discussed the likely changes that may be needed in surrogacy in 
the next 10 years.  This raised questions not only about its regulation – currently a 
significant concern, as its use is inevitably likely to escalate in step with acceptance of same-
sex marriage, but also (in view of its strict regulation in the UK)  with the likelihood of 
escalating links with overseas provision,   about the threat to its role in  the creation of 
modern families. This is posed by  the potential for links with the obvious adverse publicity 
attracted by commercial exploitation and human trafficking, which (although entirely valid 
humanitarian issues of great importance) appear to obscure the equally fundamental issues: 
(i) surrogacy is an innovative channel through which a new family unit may be created, 
particularly for same-sex spouses desirous of genetically related children; (ii) if there is to be 
reform of the law to address the concerns mentioned, this should be approached through 
the holistic field of family formation. 
In fact, while more widespread use of surrogacy may seem worryingly ‘Brave New World’ as 
in Aldous Huxley’s 1930s novel which anticipated developments in reproductive technology, as well 
as other developments such as sleep-learning and psychological manipulation, neither of which has 
remained entirely fictional, 108and even adoption was once seen as a debateable solution to 
childlessness, since that too was once a legislative creation outside the ‘natural’ norm.  
Like adoption in its time, surrogacy now needs to be viewed from the point of view of its 
role in contributing to family normativity. Thus its role should perhaps be facilitated by only 
essential regulation, rather than being heavily regulated from the perspective that it is likely 
to be only another opportunity for exploitation. Practitioners in India early highlighted this, 
since their concerns were both for (i) the risk of exploitation of poor Indian women as 
surrogates and (ii) the future welfare of the child who could originally be taken out of India 
to an unknown destination where perhaps the welfare of children was not paramount,  
indeed its welfare possibly not  monitored by the social services provided for the purpose in 
most Western jurisdictions and the child even being abandoned if the commissioning couple 
split, or tired of their child . In the context of the Indian government not taking legislation 
forward with much despatch to address the international dimension in surrogacy, some 
Indian lawyers then took the lead in such practical terms as could be effected without 
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waiting for such legislation, by achieving immigration controls so that it is no longer possible 
to engage in a surrogacy project in India on a tourist visa. Thus neither the surrogacy 
agreement nor removal of the resulting child can now take place without control of the 
entry of the commissioning parents or their exit with the child109. 
In Australia Felicity Gerry QC110 and Hon Anthony Graham QC111 have been engaged in 
research on one of the main strands of this topic, which is their specialist interest, namely 
human trafficking112 against which responsible states are ever vigilant. This is not the only 
source of concerns about this downside of the international dimension, since apart from 
India’s early identifying potential problems, the international organisations which regularly 
meet to confer at conferences also followed this up.  
The stage therefore now appears to have been reached at which the question must be 
asked: what precisely is the place of surrogacy in the context of Family Law: is it 
 - only a species of refined Human Assisted Reproduction (‘HAR’) requiring close 
regulation in the paramount interest of the welfare of the resulting child? (welfare being a 
key principle of Child Law in most advanced jurisdictions), or 
 - simply another normative channel through which the modern family is now 
created, a function which must be acknowledged, alongside same-sex  marriage, full gender 
recognition of transpersons and committed cohabitation? 
Child Protection Issues 
English law originally approached surrogacy through child protection and the key core 
principle of English Child Law, namely the paramount welfare of the child, which had its 
origins in the Guardianship of Minors Act 1925, s 1, although that original legislative 
provision took much longer to have real effect in the 1990s development of a separate 
corpus of Child Law within  family law. At that time HAR was all about creating genetic 
families for the historic opposite sex married couples who, if childless, were not content 
with adoption, which was still seen as second best, since (outside family adoptions) it 
usually lacked any link to the adopting couple. Since that date successive governments have 
spelled out the importance of the family as the ‘fundamental building block of society’113, 
and HAR (which has meanwhile developed extensively) means that all otherwise childless 
couples that can afford it, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, can now build a family with 
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genetic children. Indeed, the affordability issue appears already to be being addressed, since 
it seems that many large corporations are offering fertility and gender reassignment 
benefits, along with standard medical insurance, as part of their employees’ remuneration 
packages114. 
The historical background of the legal treatment of HAR technologies in England and Wales 
is not, in fact, extensive or complex, now depending on the HFEA 2008 as amended.  
Previously regulation dated only from around 30 years ago following the Warnock 
Report115which was itself, without much warning, generated by advances in medical science 
which had made possible the first ‘test tube’ conceptions, inevitably inaugurating an era of 
increasing complexity in ‘in vitro fertilisation’, (‘IVF’).   
This was immediately followed by the ‘Baby Cotton’ case116, presenting the court with the 
first actual surrogacy for which the judiciary was completely unprepared, as there was no 
specific legislation, which then soon followed and has since been refined as time and 
experience permitted. Following the HFEA 2008 the High Court began ratifying international 
surrogacy cases, in 2010 same-sex and unmarried couples were added to the statutory 
scheme, and nationality law amended to allow surrogate children born overseas to become 
British automatically on the making of the s 54 parental order granted to the commissioning 
parents.  
In 2016, following the case of Re Z 117 it was decided that the Act must be amended to 
include single parents, so as to be compatible with Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA 1998) incorporating the ECHR although it has taken two drafts of the Bill to achieve 
this, and in 2019 the amending statute is still not complete. 
However, judging by the Sir James Munby’s continuing interest and comments following his 
retirement in 2018, further updating can be expected to address potential change still yet to 
be realised. On  the occasion of the Personal Support Unit’s seminar at the Law Society on 
Friday 19 October 2018 he took the opportunity to spell this out, remarking ‘every concept 
of what ‘family’ is, every concept of what a parent-child relationship is, is very much back in 
the melting pot for change’. He included the now obvious fact that the cut off point for 
women to conceive naturally no longer applies, since this now occurs in their 40s and 50s so 
that ‘the judiciary will endorse a parental order for women of that age’, on which he added 
that ‘age should not stand in the way of having a family, and the menopause does not 
prevent women from having children by IVF or surrogacy’.   
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He appeared also not to rule out developments which have previously kept commercial 
surrogacy out of English Law, although permitted in other jurisdictions.  Commenting 
positively on American  systems in particularly in California (suggesting that we may in 
future have both pre- and post-birth orders) he added that ‘once we become more familiar 
with these changes and developments’ we become more accepting, suggesting that we 
should ‘give serious consideration to abolishing the restrictions on commercial surrogacy’ to 
include more than ‘reasonable expenses’ for the surrogate to carry the child, currently 
interpreted restrictively in English Law to mean expenses alone) but a much wider 
interpretation was adopted in California over 40 years ago.  Confirming that he would 
welcome a move away from ‘prohibition regulation’, including opening up of family 
structures  to‘introduce into the law of surrogacy a provision enabling the court to dispense 
with the need for the surrogate’s consent if the child’s welfare so requires’, thus mirroring 
an existing provision in adoption law (and ensuring that no child is left stateless as the result 
of a surrogacy arrangement). 118 
Interestingly, there was also discussion of a proposed new birth certificate, recognising the 
surrogate born child as that of the commissioning intended parents, thus moving towards 
one of the key USA principles to which Sir James Munby refers.119 
Conclusion 
It is obvious why Sir James Munby favours modernising amendment to the HAR 
legislation. There are several legal philosophical aspects of surrogacy and IVF to be 
considered, alongside the HFEA 2008 s 54 procedural parental order which is the 
mechanism for transferring parental responsibility for the child from the surrogate to 
the commissioning parents, whether an  opposite  or same- sex couple, whether 
related to the child or not, and which in turn depends on whether the surrogacy is 
‘partial’120 or ‘full’121.  
The 2008 Act generates most confusion about the legal philosophical infrastructure 
for surrogacy and IVF. The Act approaches not surrogacy in this respect, but 
meaningful parenting when a woman receives IVF treatment in a licensed clinic and 
has no partner or husband treated as the father, by sections 35 or 42.Under sections 
36 and 43 she may choose any man – or woman – to become a social father (or in 
the case of a woman, a second parent) provided the ‘agreed parenthood conditions’ 
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–sections 37 or 44 – are accepted. This process is used by single women or 
unmarried female partners to set up their own customised family unit, appearing 
sentimentally to hark back to the19th century social parenting which had neither 
genetic nor legal basis, save that in 2008 Parliament legislated to permit the concept 
in the 21st century, regardless of whether the woman receiving treatment had any 
close relationship, let alone biological tie, with the proposed ‘social’ parent: this was 
much criticised in the media122.   
However compared to this social parenting provision, surrogacy clearly has much 
stronger potential for creating stable families for child rearing in a nurturing 
environment: it can uniquely utilise the genetic link particularly prized in a committed 
same-sex male relationship. However surrogacy is only one of many contemporary 
ways of building family units, while stable families are a core requirement of society. 
Surrogacy reform should thus evidence  the same equality and family friendly basis as 
same-sex marriage, which is clearly the latest driver for existing surrogacy escalation, 
which motivated India in its visa regulation initiative. 
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